A server vulnerable for BREACH (Browser Reconnaissance and Exfiltration via Adaptive Compression of Hypertext) allows an attacker to decrypt cookie contents such as session information. Learn here, how you can prevent SSL BREACH.
CVSS Vector: AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
A server vulnerable for BREACH (Browser Reconnaissance and Exfiltration via Adaptive Compression of Hypertext) allows an attacker to decrypt cookie contents such as session information. Using “gzip” or “deflate” data compression via the content-encoding option within HTTP the encrypted data can be guessed by using brute-force search followed by a divide-and-conquer search.
For a successful BREACH attack, several requirements need to be met:
- The website is transferred compressed.
- The website reflects user input (e.g. a username which is given from the login form)
- The website contains a secret (e.g. a CSRF token)
The easiest form of mitigation is disabling HTTP compression, which – however – will lead to bigger sites that need to be transferred. One possibility is to disable the compression-only if the referrer is not the own application.
To disable HTTP compression from requests with different referrers, use the following settings:
SetOutputFilter DEFLATE BrowserMatch ^Mozilla/4 gzip-only-text/html BrowserMatch ^Mozilla/4\.0 no-gzip BrowserMatch \bMSIE !no-gzip !gzip-only-text/html SetEnvIfNoCase Request_URI \.(?:gif|jpe?g|png|zip|gz|tgz|htc)$ no-gzip dont-vary # BREACH migitation SetEnvIfNoCase Referer .* self_referer=no SetEnvIfNoCase Referer ^https://www\.example\.org/ self_referer=yes SetEnvIf self_referer ^no$ no-gzip Header append Vary User-Agent env=!dont-vary
HSTS – Secure Channels: Strict Transport Security
The server declares “I only talk TLS”
Example: HTTP(S) Response Header: Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=15768000; includeSubDomains
The header can be cached and also prevents leakage via subdomain-content through non-TLS links in the content
Weakness: “Trust on first use”
Server identities tend to be long-lived, but clients have to re-establish the server’s identity on every TLS session. •
How could Google/Chrome be resilient to DigiNotar attack?
Google built-in “preloaded” fingerprints for the known public keys in the certificate chains of Google properties. Thereby exposed the false *.google.com certificate DigiNotar signed
But, preloading does not scale, so we need something dynamic:
Could use an HTTP header i.e. transmit the SHA1 or SHA256 hash of the Subject Public Key Info structure of the X.509 certificate. (You could pin to end entity, intermediary, root. Select your degree of precision.)
Secure Channels: DNSSEC for TLS
DNSSEC can be used to declare supported protocols for domains
DNSSEC can be used to declare server certificate for the domain
Advantage: Advantage of trusted signed source